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he international legal rules which determine whether certain targets
may or may not be lawfully attacked are based on one of the pillars of
the international law applicable in armed conflicts, namely the distinction be-
tween the civilian population on the one hand and the military effort of the
State on the other. The development of this distinction is a historical and cul-
tural achievement of the age of enlightenment. This fact needs to be empha-
sized when there is a temptation to consider certain consequences of this
distinction as too cumbersome for what is supposed to be a necessary military
operation.
Distinction
In the centuries before the enlightenment, war was often, and then lawfully
so, conducted in a way that made the “civilian” population suffer very drasti-
cally.1 It was in particular the philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau who, in the
second half of the 18th century, developed the idea that war did not constitute
a confrontation between peoples, but between States and their rulers (“sover-
eign’s war”).2 This principle limited both the group of persons entitled to per-
form acts harmful to the enemy (combatants) and the scope of persons and
objects which may be the target of such acts (combatants/military objectives).
In the 18th and early 19th century, this distinction corresponded to the real-
ity of the conflicts of those days. It was possible and practicable to keep
1. Fritz Münch, War, Laws of, History, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
1386 et seq. (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
2. WILHELM GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2000).
military activities well apart from the day-to-day life of the citizens, unless
such unusual things as a levée en masse occurred. It was the technological de-
velopments of the late 19th and early 20th century which created the funda-
mental challenge to this distinction, namely the development of long-range
weapons, in particular air warfare. The first rather comprehensive reaction to
this challenge was an attempt at international rule making, the so-called
Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923,3 drafted by a group of experts based on a
mandate given by the 1922 Washington Conference on Disarmament. These
rules constituted a confirmation of the old distinction and developed its con-
crete application to the new situation. Rules elaborated by scientific bodies
such as the International Law Association were formulated along the same
lines.4
The great practical challenge to the traditional principle of distinction oc-
curred during the Second World War. There were so many violations of the
traditional principle that it was quite appropriate to ask the question whether
that rule had survived or whether it had become obsolete.5 The biggest chal-
lenge to the traditional rule of distinction was the development of nuclear
weapons. It is, thus, necessary to critically analyze the attitude which States
and other relevant actors adopted after the war in relation to that rule.
State practice immediately following the Second World War was somewhat
puzzled and puzzling. The definition of war crimes in the Statute of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal is based on the assumption that the rule of distinc-
tion was applicable (“wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity”). But neither the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal nor the judgments of the American mili-
tary courts really address the principle of distinction as a limitation on the
choice of targets for bombardments.6 Furthermore, there was a kind of re-
sounding silence of States in relation to that rule. The Geneva Conventions of
1949, which in many ways clarify and develop the law taking into account the
experience of the Second World War, do not address the question, yet most
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3. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 139 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3d. ed.
2000).
4. Draft Convention for the Protection of the Civilian Population Against New Engines of War,
adopted by the 40th Conference of the International Law Association, Amsterdam 1938. THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS 223 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988).
5. For a brief analysis of the practice, see ERIK CASTRÉN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND
NEUTRALITY 402 et seq (1954).
6. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1828 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
writers were loath to accept that the bombing practices of the war had
changed the law.7
In 1956, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made an
attempt to have the question of the validity of the principle of distinction clar-
ified by what was meant to become the Delhi Rules for the Limitation of the
Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War.8 This attempt
was based on the assumption that the traditional rule of distinction was still
valid, but it failed. It became, so to say, the victim of the development of nu-
clear weapons or, more precisely, of a dispute concerning their legality. The
military establishment of the day, it appears, remained completely outside the
legal discourse concerning the legality of those nuclear weapons, of which the
resolution of the Institut de Droit International of 19699 concerning the pro-
hibition of weapons of mass destruction is a lively testimony.
That insulation of the legal discourse disappeared when the issue of the re-
affirmation and development of international humanitarian law came on the
political agenda as a consequence of the debate about the conduct of the
Vietnam War and the issue of “human rights in occupied territory.”10 In 1968,
the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed the traditional principle in
its resolution “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts,” which de-
clared: “That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population
as such; That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking
part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population. . . .”11
The negotiations from 1974 to 1977 that led to the Additional Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions12 and the reactions of States, including
major military powers, after the adoption of the Protocol in 1977 are clearly
based on the assumption that the basic content of the rule of distinction is
part of customary international law. This is, in particular, reflected in the for-
mulation of the declarations made by the United States and the United King-
dom on the occasion of the signature of the Protocol. In respect of so-called
175
Michael Bothe
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9. The Distinction between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects in General and
particularly the Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, Resolution adopted by
the Institut de Droit International at its session at Edinburg on September 9, 1969. Id. at 265.
10. Michael Bothe in MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH AND WALDEMAR SOLF, NEW RULES
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11. G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7128 (1969).
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 3, at 422 [hereinafter Protocol I].
non-conventional weapons, they deny that the “new rules” of the Protocol ap-
ply to those weapons, the clear implication being that the “old,” i.e., custom-
ary law rules do apply. It is made clear that the principle of distinction figures
among these old rules.13
In addition, a legal discourse developed which now included military law-
yers dealing with practical implications of this rule. Military lawyers explained
and continued to explain that major bombing campaigns like those during the
Vietnam14 and 1991 Persian Gulf15 wars were indeed conducted on the basis of
these rules. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the rule has survived all ma-
jor challenges; that it is still part and parcel of customary law. This, however,
raises the question of the interpretation of the rule in the light of changing
circumstances.
The Two-Pronged Test of the Military Objective
As to the selection of targets in general and in air warfare in particular, the
basic rule that follows from the distinction between the civilian population
and the military effort is the distinction between military objectives and civil-
ian objects. That distinction is to be made on the basis of two interrelated ele-
ments, namely the effective contribution the military objective makes to
military action and the “definite military advantage” that the total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization of the objective offers. There is no
doubt that this is a rule of customary international law and its binding force is,
thus, not limited to the parties to Protocol I, which formulates this very prin-
ciple as follows in Article 52(2): “military objectives are limited to those ob-
jects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite mil-
itary advantage.”16
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14. Burrus Carnahan, “Linebacker II” and Protocol I: the Convergence of Law and Professionalism,
31 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 861 (1982).
15. See Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I, 88
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 678, 681 (1994).
16. Protocol I, supra note 12, at 450.
The most recent practical confirmation of the customary law character of
these principles is the experts report17 published by the Chief Prosecutor of the
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia concerning the question whether
the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) involved the commission of crimes which were subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal—a report which constitutes an important document if
lessons are to be drawn from the Kosovo experience.
The difficulty of the Article 52(2) definition is its general character. There
are, of course, clear cases of “pure” military objectives: military barracks,
trenches in a battlefield, etcetera. Where objects are used or usable for differ-
ent, military and non-military purposes (dual-use objects), their qualification
as a military objective or civilian object becomes more difficult. What consti-
tutes an “effective contribution” to military action? What is a “definite” mili-
tary advantage? What is the difference, if any, between an “indefinite” or a
“definite” military advantage? This brings us to the crucial problems of target-
ing. It must be realized that the application of rules formulated in general
terms is a problem lawyers often encounter, not only in the law of war, but also
in international law in general—even law in general. Legal rules expressed in
general clauses need concretization for their practical application. The ques-
tion, thus, is how to render the general principle of distinction more concrete
in order to have secure standards for targeting.
A standard legislative method of rendering a general rule more concrete is
the establishment of a list of cases of application, be it exhaustive or illustra-
tive. This approach has been proposed by Professor Dinstein.18 It presents a
few problems of its own. An illustrative list may be useful for certain purposes,
but it cannot terminate the discussion because the qualification of items that
are not on the list remains open. The exhaustive list is dangerous, because it
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18. See, e.g. Professor Dinstein’s paper in this volume.
can exclude clear cases falling under the general rule, which were just forgot-
ten or not foreseen when the list was drafted. Thus, there is often a tendency
to add a catchall clause at the end of a list.19 At that point one is for all practi-
cal purposes back to the illustrative list.
Despite these deficiencies of the list method, the ICRC in 1956 attempted
to draft such a list of military objectives.20 In relation to the difficult or contro-
versial questions, this list shows all the problems of this method. The list is
based on the undisputed fact that there are certain typical military objectives
which can indeed be listed, but this is possible only to a limited extent. There
are objects that in one context may constitute a military objective, making an
effective contribution to military action, while in other circumstances they do
not. This is clearly shown in the items on the list that have become quite con-
troversial in the context of the Kosovo campaign, namely lines and means of
communication and in particular telecommunication facilities.
As to traffic infrastructure, the formulation of the ICRC list is as follows:
“Those of the lines and means of communications (railway lines, roads,
bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance.”
Thus, a distinction has to be made between those lines and means of commu-
nications that are of fundamental military importance and those that are not.
Only those lines of communication that are of fundamental military impor-
tance are military objectives. This is clearly stated in Article 7, Paragraph 3 of
the ICRC Draft Rules to which the list was to be annexed: “However, even if
they belong to one of those categories, they cannot be considered as a military
objective where their total or partial destruction, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offers no military advantage.”
As a consequence, in every instance the question of the military impor-
tance of a bridge or railway line is unavoidable. It is submitted that to ask this
very question is the only correct application of the rule of distinction. There is
no rule saying that railway lines and bridges are always a military objective.
Their military importance has to be ascertained in each particular case. This is
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the crucial problem of dual-use facilities. This problem applies to traffic infra-
structure, telecommunication infrastructure and also to energy production
and transmission facilities.
In the traditional context of land warfare, the military importance of traffic
infrastructure is quite obvious. This traffic infrastructure is needed in order to
bring supplies to the front or, as the case may be, to allow a swift retreat of the
troops which may then reorganize afterwards. The examples given by Profes-
sor Dinstein21 in order to prove his thesis are all taken from this context. Dur-
ing the so-called Christmas bombing of Hanoi, it was the use of railway lines
for logistical support that was put forward as a justification for choosing cer-
tain targets (mainly railroads) in the very center of this city.22 But what was
the military importance of the many bridges crossing the Danube River that
were destroyed during the Kosovo campaign? There was no front to which
supplies could have been moved. It was the declared policy of the NATO
States not to create such a front but to renounce to ground operations and to
restrict military action to an air campaign. In such a situation, it is very hard to
see any military importance of this traffic infrastructure. If there is no such
military importance, these means of communication are civilian objects, not
military objectives.
With respect to the telecommunication network, the situation may be
somewhat different. This network is of military importance even in the con-
text of a conflict where one side uses the strategy of air warfare only, while the
other side, by necessity, would have to rely on anti-aircraft defense. This de-
fense certainly depends on telecommunications, but it remains questionable
whether each facility using telecommunications equipment that may be found
in the country belongs, for that reason, to a network of military significance. Is
there a kind of presumption that telecommunication facilities are always, un-
less the contrary is apparent, related to the military network?
This seems to be the underlying rationale of the Report to the Prosecutor.23
It brings us to a question of precautionary duties, duties of due diligence in
evaluating the military importance of certain objects and more generally the
decision-making process to which we will revert below. This was the crucial
problem in evaluating the lawfulness of the attack against the television facili-
ties in Belgrade. Could the target selectors just proceed on the basis of the as-
sumption or presumption that the technical equipment of this station was so
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21. See Professor Dinstein’s paper in the present volume.
22. Carnahan, supra note 14, at 864 et seq.
23. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, ¶ 72.
closely linked to the military network that, although there was an obvious ci-
vilian use, its military importance was significant enough that its destruction
provided a definite military advantage?
So far, the notion of contribution to the military effort or of military advan-
tage has been discussed in tactical or operational terms. The question then
arises whether this notion could also be understood in a broader sense. Can
objects that are not related to specific military operations also “contribute to
the military effort?” Air attacks have a definite impact on the morale of the
entire population and, thus, also on political and military decision-makers. It
may well be argued that it was not only the diplomatic efforts by
Chernomyrdin and Ahtassari, but also or even mainly the impact of the bomb-
ing campaign that finally induced Milosevic to agree to a withdrawal of the
Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo. Did the bombing for that rea-
son provide a “definite military advantage”?
As is rightly pointed out by Professor Dinstein and the Report to the Prose-
cutor,24 this type of “advantage” is political, not military. The morale of the
population and of political decision-makers is not a contribution to “military
action.” Thus, the advantage of softening the adversary’s will to resist is not a
“military” one and, thus, cannot be used as a legitimation for any targeting de-
cision. If it were otherwise, it would be all too easy to legitimize military action
which uses bombing just as a psychological weapon—and there are other
words for this.
The practical importance of this limitation is considerable and not new. It
would indeed be impossible to make any meaningful distinction between civil-
ian objects and military objectives as the psychological effect can be produced
by an attack on any target, including entirely civilian living quarters. The mo-
rale of the civilian population and of political decision-makers was the main
target of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—not a legit-
imate one. During the bombing of North Vietnamese targets, already men-
tioned, in addition to the military significance of the traffic infrastructure as
channels for military supplies, “forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes of
the North Vietnamese leadership” was also recognized as a goal of the bomb-
ing campaigns against that country.25 The NATO bombing campaign against
the FRY was also designed to induce the Belgrade leadership to accept a set-
tlement of the status of the Kosovo along the lines of NATO terms. Although
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25. Carnahan, supra note 14, at 867.
the psychological impact of a certain attack may be a legitimate consideration
in choosing between targets that are for other reasons of a military character,
that impact alone is not sufficient to establish the qualification of a certain tar-
get as a military objective.
This legal situation introduces a basic ambiguity, or a fictitious character,
into targeting decisions to be made within the framework of an armed conflict
conducted for humanitarian purposes. As the goal of such a “war” is not the
military defeat of an adversary, but the protection of the human rights of the
population, the traditional notion of military advantage loses much of its sig-
nificance. In the Kosovo campaign target selection was made on the basis of
the fiction that military advantages and military victory in the traditional
sense were sought, although this was not the case. The only real goal was a
change of attitude of the Belgrade government. Thus, the question of what re-
ally constitutes a military objective within the framework of a humanitarian
intervention has to be asked. It would better correspond to the specific char-
acter of that particular type of military operation if only “pure” military objec-
tives, in the sense mentioned already above, were considered to be legitimate
targets.
The Environment—A Military Objective?
An additional comment is necessary concerning the environment as a mili-
tary objective or civilian object. The rules of Protocol I relating to the protec-
tion of the environment, i.e., Articles 35(3) and 55, not only limit the
permissible collateral damage to the environment caused by attacks against
military objectives, but also limit permissible attacks where the environment
itself constitutes a military objective, which is quite possible. Military objec-
tives are not just persons or manmade structures: a piece of land can become a
military objective if its neutralization offers a definite military advantage. In-
terdiction fire is an example. This type of military action is not directly tar-
geted at combatants. The military usefulness consists of the fact that by
bringing a certain area under constant fire, the enemy is deterred from enter-
ing that area. Cutting down, or defoliating, trees in order to deprive the enemy
of cover is another example. The consequences of such actions for the envi-
ronment may be disastrous. In such cases, for the reasons indicated, the rules
of Articles 35(3) and 55 protect the environment when it is a military
objective.
An attack against the environment, however, is unlawful only where the
damage caused or expected is “widespread, long-term and severe.” These
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three conditions are cumulative. All three must be met for there to be a viola-
tion. Therefore, we are back to the problem of general clauses and their
concretization. It is true that many of the delegations present at the confer-
ence in Geneva that drafted Protocol I favored a very high threshold.26 It ap-
pears that the Kosovo campaign has not really given any new impetus to
concretize this threshold, as the actual environmental damage remained be-
low that limit. The threshold is still an open question, but the very fact that
the Report to the Prosecutor starts its legal assessment of the bombing cam-
paign by analyzing the question of environmental destruction27 shows that en-
vironmental considerations have indeed become an important restraint on
military activities, although the legal reasoning of the report in this respect is
highly questionable.28
In a first approach, the Report to the Prosecutor uses Articles 35(3) and 55
of Protocol I as the basic yardstick to determine the legality of any damage
caused to the environment. It does not give a final answer to the question
whether these provisions have become a rule of customary international law.
The report simply finds that the damage caused by the NATO air campaign
does not meet the triple cumulative threshold established by these provisions
of being “widespread, long-term and severe.”
If one takes the factual findings of the Balkan Task Force established by the
United Nations Environment Programme, this conclusion is probably un-
avoidable. What is interesting, however, is that the assessment made by the
committee does not stop at this point. It also analyses environmental damage
in the light of the proportionality principle which is the usual test for the ad-
missibility of collateral damage caused by attacks against military targets. This,
as a matter of principle, is a valid point. This line of argument could be used as
a means to lower the difficult threshold of Articles 35 and 55. Once it was es-
tablished that collateral environmental damage was excessive in relation to a
military advantage anticipated, it would also be unlawful even it was not wide-
spread, long-lasting and severe.
A systematic interpretation of Protocol I would lead to the conclusion that
the environment is protected by the combined effect of the general provision
limiting admissible collateral damage and the particular provision on environ-
mental damage. It would mean that in a concrete case, the stricter limitation
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would apply. Unfortunately, the report does not draw this conclusion. Instead,
it refers to the formulation of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) Statute as “an authoritative indicator of evolving customary in-
ternational law.”29 This provision, which is quite unfortunate from the point
of view of environmental protection, creates a different type of cumulative ef-
fect of the rules on the protection of the environment and the proportionality
principle. Causing environmental damage is only a war crime if it goes, first,
beyond the threshold established by the triple cumulative conditions and, sec-
ond, beyond what is permissible according to the proportionality principle. In
the light of the reservations which the military establishment shows vis-à-vis
taking into account environmental concerns as a limitation on military vio-
lence, this is probably as far as one could go in the definition of a war crime. It
should be stressed, however, that this stance can be accepted only for the defi-
nition of the war crime, not as far as the interpretation of the primary rules of
behavior relating to the protection of the environment in times of armed con-
flicts are concerned. The damage caused to the environment is unlawful if it is
either excessive or widespread, long-term and severe. Causing the damage,
however, is a war crime only if damage fulfils both criteria.
Decision-Making: Ascertaining Relevant Facts
As already pointed out, a targeting decision must involve a certain factual
evaluation of the actual or potential use of specific objects as to whether they
make or do not make a contribution to military action. Protocol I prescribes
that efforts have to be made in order to ascertain the military character of an
objective.30 On the other hand, the targeting decision is certainly one which
has to be taken in a context of uncertainty. It is unrealistic to require absolute
certainty concerning the military importance of a specific object before it can
be lawfully attacked, but not requiring absolute certainty is not the same as
permitting disregard of the facts.
Whatever the actual standard of due diligence, there is an obligation of due
diligence in ascertaining the character of a proposed target. This question
arises, in modern decision making, on two different levels, that of target selec-
tion at the command level and that of launching the actual attack, which is
not the same, as the case of the attack on a bridge which also hit a civilian
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train (not a selected target) demonstrates.31 A violation of this duty of due dil-
igence is a violation of the law of armed conflict. In such cases as the attack
against the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, there are reasons to believe that in-
deed the selection of that particular building as a target was due to a violation
of this obligation of due diligence and therefore a negligent violation of the
law of armed conflict.
Decision-Making: Balancing Processes and Value Judgments
The evaluation of the military advantage to be derived from an attack is not
only a matter of the relevant facts, but also a matter of value judgments. What
constitutes an advantage is a matter of subjective evaluation. This raises the
question of “whose values matter?” In a somewhat different context, namely
the value judgment involved in the assessment of proportionality, the Report
to the Prosecutor states that this must be the judgment of the “reasonable mil-
itary commander.”32 This statement, plausible as it may appear at a first
glance, is problematic. In a democratic system, the value judgment which
matters most is that of the majority of the society at large. The military cannot
and may not constitute a value system of its own, separated by waterproof
walls from that of civil society. Such separation would be to the disadvantage
of both the military and civil society. A dialogue between the two, critical and
constructive in both directions, is needed.
This is essential for a number of reasons. There is no denying the fact that
public opinion in many countries views the military with a critical eye. This is
particularly true for certain organizations of civil society engaged in the pro-
motion of human rights. It is certainly in the interest of both the military and
civil society organizations to avoid a situation where such critique is based on
a lack of understanding and on misconceptions.33 Furthermore, the practice
observed in recent conflicts indeed recognizes that targeting decisions have
political implications. This is why certain decisions are reserved to persons
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that are very high in the governmental hierarchy. Targeting decisions engage
the political responsibility to the electorate, i.e., civil society, of those holding
high governmental offices. Therefore, these decisions have to be understand-
able and acceptable to civil society; hence the need for a dialogue.
The Problem of Errors
The question of values or value judgments leads to the problem of error or
mistake in judgment. Such an error may relate to the facts or to the law. In the
case of the Chinese Embassy, it was an error of fact. When the decision was
made to attack a particular building, the decision-makers thought, or at least
this is what we were told, that the building had a military use. The deci-
sion-makers did not know that it was the Chinese Embassy, which was obvi-
ously not a military objective.
In relation to attacks against railways and bridges, another question arises,
namely the error of law. In this case, there was probably no erroneous evalua-
tion of the actual use of those bridges and railway lines as a matter of fact. The
essential error, if the view submitted by this paper is correct, consisted in a
mistaken view of the law that considered traffic infrastructure as military ob-
jectives without asking the question of their military importance in the con-
crete context. As a matter of principle, an error of law does not exclude
responsibility. Ignorantia iuris is no excuse or even circumstance excluding the
wrongfulness of the behavior.
What are the consequences of these problems of due diligence and error on
criminal accountability? The definition of war crimes contained in the statute
of the permanent International Criminal Court34 requires intent.35 Violations
of the laws of war committed by negligence are not subject to the jurisdiction
of that court. The situation is, however, different with respect to the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Any viola-
tion of the laws and customs of war comes within the jurisdiction of that court
according to Article 3 of its statute.36 Thus, the ICTY would have had juris-
diction to prosecute and punish negligent violations of the laws of war which,
as indicated, appear to be quite possible in this case. It is in this context that
the question of error becomes most relevant. An error concerning the facts
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may entail a negligent violation of the respective rule, an error concerning the
law, as a rule, does not constitute a valid defense.
The Law of War and Humanitarian Intervention—Some General
Reflections
It must be stressed that all these considerations concerning lawful means
and methods of combat are independent from the question whether the
Kosovo air campaign was or was not a violation of the rules of the United Na-
tions Charter prohibiting the use of force. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello have to
be kept separate. This is the essential basis for a realistic approach to the law of
armed conflict that has to treat both parties to a conflict on an equal footing.
Questions of the legality or illegality of the use of force in a particular context
have to be raised in other contexts, not in that of the application of the jus in
bello. The equality of the parties in relation to the jus in bello is an essential pre-
condition to the effective functioning of this body of law. This is why the
Preamble to Protocol I reaffirms this principle in no uncertain terms: “Reaf-
firming that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances . . ., without any ad-
verse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the
causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict.”
The principle of the equality of the parties to a conflict does not exclude the
need to consider the entire context of a conflict, its intrinsic character, when
determining the concept of military objective. Military advantage, as already
pointed out, is a contextual notion. Where the declared purpose of a military
action is limited from the outset, where the goal pursued is not just victory, but
something else, it is difficult to ignore this limitation when it comes to the
question what constitutes an advantage in that particular context. Thus,
where the exclusive purpose of a military operation is to safeguard the human
rights of a certain population, this very context excludes, it is submitted, a legal
construction of the notion of military advantage or contribution to the military
effort which disregards the life and health of this very population. In other
words, in this context, the notion of military objective has to be construed in a
much narrower way than in other types of conflict.
This contextual concept of military advantage is, it is submitted, lex lata. It
must not be confused with proposals de lege ferenda demanding special rules for
the conduct of so-called humanitarian interventions. If such rules were to be
adopted, they could only mean an additional unilateral restraint imposed on
those States or organizations which intervene for the sake of safeguarding the
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human rights of a certain population. Such rules could not and should not af-
fect the rights and duties of the other party to the conflict.
More critical review of the notion of military advantage is needed. If the
law were to be developed by a specific legal instrument relating to humanitar-
ian intervention, why not impose on the forces maintaining the rule of law and
human rights, obligations that are stricter than the usual rules of targeting
valid for any belligerent?
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